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The Politics of Legitimation in Post-Soviet Eurasia
Martin Brusis
The Eurasian successor states of the former Soviet Union hold regular elections, but few political regimes in the region meet democratic standards. Despite the color revolutions and subsequent protest movements, which have shown that the manipulation of elections entails considerable risks for incumbents, non-democratic arrangements of political rule have emerged and persist in many of the region's states. In fact, most of these political regimes have survived public protests and other challenges or threats originating from elite disagreements, ethnic divisions and economic crises. The causes and conditions of this robustness, however, are not yet well understood among scholars.
A growing body of research aims to explore the sources of stability in authoritarian regimes across the world (for reviews of the literature, see Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Morse, 2012; Brancati, 2014) . One key finding in this literature points to the role of political institutions such as elections, ruling political parties and legislatures; these perform important functions for authoritarian incumbents, for example, as tools of co-optation, credible instruments of self-constraint or channels of societal information. These important insights have solidly challenged the assumption that formal political institutions are merely facades behind which authoritarian rulers wield discretionary power. Moreover, the use of elections as instruments of authoritarian rule has led scholars to suggest that we are witnessing a new 'electoral', 'competitive' type of authoritarianism that differs from 'closed' or 'full' authoritarianism and democracy (Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010) .
However, the ambition of combining large-n evidence with generalizability has led many scholars in this new wave of research on authoritarianism to adopt instrumentalist or rationalist views of institutions that 1 are most amenable to formal models which ignore national contexts (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012) . Defining institutions primarily as sets of rules that structure interaction, these approaches focus on how utility-maximizing political actors engineer institutions and their regulatory functions. These approaches, however, neglect the fact that institutions also serve legitimatory functions which are embedded in shared historical and cultural experience. But authoritarian rulers cannot simply create political institutions at will. Institutions are more than equilibria, reflecting the preferences of political actors whose behavior they are to regulate (March and Olsen, 1989) .
This volume features contributions from scholars who in principle concur with this theoretical position. Their common aim is to study the legitimatory dimension of non-democratic political regimes and the relationship between institutional legitimacy and stability. Based upon an empirical concept of legitimacy that considers legitimacy beliefs and their justifications (Beetham, 1991) , institutional legitimacy is conceived here as the functional and normative appropriateness of institutions with regard to shared interpretations and beliefs. This notion assumes a plurality of sources, modes and patterns of legitimation from which political actors can draw upon when either claiming or contesting the legitimacy of institutions.
This volume focuses on a single region, post-Soviet Eurasia (PSE), in order to investigate the impact of historical and cultural references common to this area. For many scholars, PSE is deemed to include Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasian and Central Asian successor states of the former Soviet Union. However, valid arguments can be made in favor of excluding specific states from this group, including other states, dividing the overall region into more homogenous subregions, or studying Russia separately. Research interests and theoretical considerations must inform decisions regarding the definitional scope of this region and the selection of individual countries.
Since this volume studies the politics of legitimation in nondemocratic regimes, it seems appropriate to focus on those states that share the legacy of the former Soviet Union and its assumed relevance for legitimation, but which have not established stable democracies. It should be noted that the term 'non-democratic' refers to more and less authoritarian political regimes as well as hybrid regimes situated between full autocracy and consolidated democracy. Moreover, our volume's goal has not been to examine all post-Soviet Eurasian states systematically. Rather, the contributors have identified cases encompassing a single or several countries within this region as examples in order to examine questions of wider regional and theoretical relevance.
The conceptual framework for these empirical studies is outlined in this chapter. This chapter explains the relevance of institutional legitimacy for post-Soviet Eurasia and discusses approaches to distinguishing modes of legitimation. It is claimed that struggles over the legitimacy of political institutions are crucial for the stability of non-democratic regimes. The politics of legitimation affects conflicts between rival elite factions, the level of popular support accorded to incumbents and the strength of civil society, because institutional legitimacy shapes both the distribution of resources among political actors and the beliefs held by citizens.
Why institutional legitimacy matters
We can look at several features of non-democratic regimes in the postSoviet and other regions of the world to help explain the importance of institutional legitimacy. First, the legitimating function of elections is a defining attribute of the new authoritarianism that has not been explicitly included within influential contemporary conceptual frameworks (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 18) . The recent notions of 'electoral' and 'competitive' authoritarianism aspire to be more parsimonious than the 'classical' definition of authoritarianism proposed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan which includes 'distinctive mentalities' and legitimacy as a key feature of 'democratic-authoritarian hybrid regimes' (Linz, 2000, p. 159; Stepan and Linz, 2013, p. 20) .
According to Andreas Schedler, '[e]lectoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections [but] violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than "instruments of democracy" ' (2006, p. 3) . This definition acknowledges that elections do not de facto serve to select political elites, but rather to reinforce the popular belief that political elites are selected in competitive elections and to cultivate this interpretation among external actors. For elections to become 'instruments of authoritarian rule', a majority of citizens need to believe that they do, in fact, regulate access to power. If incumbent political elites were to give citizens cause to perceive elections as a 'game' rather than a serious competition, the elites would lose their legitimacy. This definition suggests that popular views about the appropriate competitiveness of elections are the key constraint to incumbents' ability to retain power.
Second, post-Soviet authoritarian regimes differ from other autocracies because they lack sufficient alternative sources of legitimacy. Since fraudulent elections have frequently evoked protests aimed at emulating the popular mobilization of the color revolutions, incumbent elites have ample grounds to be worried about sustaining the legitimatory function of elections. This concern constrains the extent to which they can manipulate outcomes at their discretion. Responding to protests with increased repression could jeopardize the permissive consensus among those citizens who had hitherto tolerated or were indifferent to electoral irregularities. Increased repression would also entail high political costs by damaging, for example, the regime's international legitimacy. Governments in several PSE countries have therefore sought to render increased levels of repression legitimate by adopting more restrictive rules on association and assembly rights that endow law-enforcement agencies with the legal justification to prosecute civil society organizations and activists.
Post-Soviet political elites cannot draw on alternative sources of traditional legitimacy that are still available in the authoritarian monarchies of the Gulf region, for example. Legitimating visions of development are either discredited or (at least) suspected of utopism due to the memory of the failed Communist experiment. Post-Soviet regimes thus depend on their capacities to produce mass prosperity, security and other common goods (Sil and Chen, 2004, p. 363; Feklyunina and White, 2011, p. 401) . This systemic performance, in conjunction with incumbent presidents' associated technocratic knowledge and personal charisma, has been an important source of legitimacy. However, this performance has suffered from the global economic crisis that has hit Russia and other post-Soviet countries harder than China and other emerging markets with authoritarian political regimes.
Given the dearth and erosion of alternative legitimacy sources, since 2012, the Russian government has increasingly resorted to mobilizing nationalist sentiment (e.g., Rubtsov, 2014) . Russia incorporated Crimea in 2014, claiming that the peninsula constitutes a historical part of Russia, that its residents feel closely tied to Russia and that Crimea's ethnic Russian and Russophone majority populations required protection against threats of forced assimilation emerging from the new Ukrainian government. Russia also supported separatist insurgents in the Eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk who claimed
